RCE in Gnupg

(lists.gnupg.org)

136 points | by gdgghhhhh 7 hours ago

10 comments

  • uptrails 4 hours ago
    Reportedly fixed by Red Hat 5 years ago based on the output from conventional tools, but missed by upstream: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/gpgme/-/blob/c9...
  • miduil 5 hours ago

           This vulnerability was discovered by Johan Carlsson and we were informed by GitLab on 2026-11-12.
           Initially we set 2026-11-25 for a coordinated disclosure;
           due to the new Ruby2Shell bug GitLab had to update earlier
           and thus we also disclosed the GPGME bug on 2026-11-20.
    
    I guess pretty important for GitLab since it supports signed commits, code execution in that path is pretty bad.

    You can find the GitLab Omnibus related patch here: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/omnibus-gitlab/-/commit/279ac3...

  • mik1998 3 hours ago
    It's a double free bug, not an RCE chain. Are these vulnerability reports intentionally overstated?
    • mhluongo 21 minutes ago
      Today's LLMs can often escalate to RCE, so it makes sense to assume the worst.
    • InsidiousWombat 1 hour ago
      Yes, the actual post just implies possibility

      > Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't be ruled out.

    • gdgghhhhh 3 hours ago
      Sending somebody a signed message and trigger a double free is a prime example for RCE
      • kuroguro 3 hours ago
        RCE might be possible, you still need to overlay something useful in the freed memory and bypass ASLR.
        • Deeg9rie9usi 2 hours ago
          The mail says "Exploiting this bug to mount an Remote Code Execution attack (RCE) can't be ruled out.". They didn't write this just for fun. gnupg usually downplays security issues.
          • kuroguro 2 hours ago
            I'd say that is as accurate as they can be. Since it's a library and it's a heap bug they have no idea how a particular application will be affected.

            It's still a critical bug, just would not call it a prime example of rce.

          • wavemode 1 hour ago
            I mean, the blame is moreso on the title of this HackerNews submission. "RCE can't be ruled out" is not equivalent to "RCE in Gnupg"
          • Sopel 2 hours ago
            it can't be ruled out that an RCE exists in other parts of this software either
      • gsich 3 hours ago
        poc needed.
        • Deeg9rie9usi 3 hours ago
          IMHO, these days any kind of UB has to be considered exploitable by an LLM. The times of debating whether something is exploitable or not are over.
          • Deeg9rie9usi 1 hour ago
            It's interesting to see how polarizing this comment is, it's being upvoted and downvoted in waves.
          • gsich 2 hours ago
            We are having this debate right now. So it's far from over. Without PoC it's unclear if it's RCE or just overhyped bullshit. See PHP or Nginx "RCE" which required specific crafted settings for it to even work. A video is not a "PoC".

            If you believe an LLM can generate an exploit for this - feel free to post one.

            • o_-_o 2 hours ago
              I agree PoC's should be a requirement for all this exploits.
              • InsidiousWombat 1 hour ago
                at the very least should be criteria for assigning "high", CVE spam is annoying enough as it is
  • usr1106 3 hours ago
    What are practical attack vectors for Linux workstations and servers?

    The masses of internet users don't know what GPG is. I'd caim the majority of software developers don't have a GPG key and never explicitly verify any signature.

    But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?

    • firesteelrain 18 minutes ago
      It’s used a lot in commercial for code signing. We use it with Thales HSMs (there are other things in the middle)
      • usr1106 6 minutes ago
        Are sure? The announcement says gpgme. Is that the same thing used for basic signatures?
    • kodoman 1 hour ago
      > But packages of many distros are verified using GPG. Is the vulnerable component involved or not?

      Debian uses it last time I was on a Debian system And I think all Debian based distros that don't modify apt will essentially use GPG to verify the packages as well.

      I think it's one of the those programs that pop up in a lot of different things. Personally I use it a fair amount and even use the Symmetric encryption features for some files and for personal password management.

      I do think developer are moving away from it thought I agree (and for various reasons that are good).

    • OJFord 2 hours ago
      Potentially package update/installation? A lot of people use gpg without knowing it.

      It's specifically in 'GPGME' though, so more limited scope I think.

      • capitol_ 2 hours ago
        A lot of those places have switched out the gnupg PGP implementation with sequoia-openpgp.
        • usr1106 3 minutes ago
          Interesting. Can you give examples. The only places I have met sequoia were conference talks by their maintainer, probably founder.
      • usr1106 2 hours ago
        That was my question. Where is gpgme used? Any "unexpected" places?
    • lazka 2 hours ago
      Arch Linux uses gpgme to verify downloaded packages (and optionally, package databases) for example.
    • gdgghhhhh 3 hours ago
      PGP mail?
      • Geezus_42 3 hours ago
        Which almost no one uses.
        • gdgghhhhh 3 hours ago
          Wrong bubble ;-)
          • Geezus_42 2 hours ago
            If only people in a certain bubble use it, then almost no one actually uses it.
            • kodoman 1 hour ago
              > no one actually uses it.

              A lot of people use it especially certain high value targets on darknet drug markets who might miss this.

              A lot of projects do still use it for signing projects though many have opted for simpler solutions (or unfortunately no signing).

              I think Debian still uses it (not sure about ubuntu) in apt.

              • Geezus_42 1 hour ago
                Darknet drug dealers are still an extreme minority of people. You still have not negated my statement.

                Sure, GPG gets used for signing packages and that COULD potentially lead to a supply chain attack IF this is not quickly patched.

  • mmsc 3 hours ago
    The vulnerability is in GpgME (the library), not GnuTLS (the library).
  • usr1106 2 hours ago
    Editorialized submission title to be better bait.

    The correct title is: GnuPG Security Advisory for GPGME

    • g-b-r 1 hour ago
      Which wouldn't tell us anything before checking the link
      • fn-mote 1 hour ago
        The current title is "RCE in Gnupg". A more appropriate title would be "Double free produces posible RCE in GnuPG". The non-editorialized title would also be better because it does not claim there is an RCE that is not known to exist.

        "Probable RCE in GnuPG clients" would be appropriate.

        When someone posts a Claude POC, then the situation is different.

        • g-b-r 1 hour ago
          Alright, possible RCE would be fair
  • fock 1 hour ago
    so essentially look at the key before? (and hope your program does not have another RCE...)
  • IshKebab 2 hours ago
    Luckily nobody uses it!
  • Velocifyer 2 hours ago
    This is a reminder that Seqouia-PGP exists, and its 'sq' CLI is way more intuitive.
  • legsrunny 4 hours ago
    more or less than 0 impacted systems?