50 comments

  • pajamasam 1 day ago
    I found the Machine Gods interview with Meredith Whittaker really interesting. She specifically talked about this issue of AI apps having too much access on users’ devices and that Signal is struggling to prevent these apps from getting access to users’ Signal chats. And that even if you don’t have an AI app installed, your contact could and thereby still leaks your chat.

    Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”

    • ebb_earl_co 1 day ago
    • nkrisc 20 hours ago
      Your chats can always be leaked by the other participant, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in all chat apps, for all of the history of the written word.
      • Forgeties79 20 hours ago
        Yes but ostensibly that is a deliberate action whereas people who are letting AI run amok on their stuff aren’t always aware of what exactly it is doing.

        It’s like iCloud. If I send a photo of my kids to my parents, that could wind up on their iClouds. At that point whatever Apple does with that is out of my hands. I can clearly explain this to them if needed. But with AI there’s a lot more opacity, plus the average person does not understand permissions or look at TOS to see how their stuff is used.

        • dmoose 17 hours ago
          Even if completely aware of what it is doing and having understood all permissions and TOS the minute it leaves your control it is subject to changes in all of the above. That would be assuming that the provider is actually totally in control of their systems and procedures which is unlikely in any absolute sense. The safest approach is to not share or make accessible anything you wouldn't willingly make public.

          Obviously a kids birthday party picture is quite a different risk profile from confidential sourced journalism but always having the thought in mind is a good way to make the sharing a conscious choice to accept the risk or not.

          • Forgeties79 2 hours ago
            I think you’re missing my point. When people install Claude or whatever on their computer, they then let it hook into practically every system. Their email, their calendars, their photos, you name it. So suddenly they are exposing all kinds of stuff that previously you could reasonably assume wasn’t being fed straight to AI companies. There is a pretty big gap between what I was describing previously and that. And the fact is that most users, even if they kind of understand what’s going on, I don’t think fully understand the extent to which they are just cracking open their home and privacy for Altman et al. Which means I am now looped in by association most likely.

            What am I going to do? Not send emails or text anymore to that person?

            It’s like glassholes. The problem is when they’re walking around they’re just pushing whatever’s in front of them up to private servers. What am I going to do? Hunt them down and dodge all of their lines of sight?

      • mrtesthah 17 hours ago
        Given that Signal already controls both sides of the conversation, I think they ought to just make these anti-AI controls enabled automatically for any conversation that has disappearing messages enabled (or perhaps use an additional user-settable per-conversation setting). That way any participant could prevent the other(s) from leaking messages to AI surveillance on their respective devices. This would reverse the viral direction of information leakage.
        • solyin 17 hours ago
          there is a desktop client though, at which point, all bets are off. Russia was documented trying to get Ukrainians to somehow scan signal QR codes in order to hack into their conversations.
        • warkdarrior 17 hours ago
          DRM for the win!
      • mitthrowaway2 13 hours ago
        So let's reduce the surface area of the "unintentionally leaked" threat model
    • amelius 23 hours ago
      Time for a Signal OS or a Signal phone?
      • djl0 22 hours ago
        To you and the commenter who mentioned GrapheneOS (which I think is amazing), isn't a big problem here that you would need both parties on this privacy OS (whether graphene or a new signal OS)? Maybe a signal feature to say whether the other party is on an os that doesn't screen-scan, but if iOS and android continue to, that's a super small sliver of convos (that don't have at least 1 party on there). Seems like the signal mission is to offer privacy to the masses, and having an indicator whether it's "actually" private or not undermines that.
      • this_user 22 hours ago
        I'd rather they remain focussed on their core product. Look at Mozilla, they continue to start random new projects that keep failing, while their one actually important product fell further and further behind, losing most of its market share in the process.
        • none_to_remain 21 hours ago
          It's the same people who took over Mozilla and Wikipedia
          • mplewis 21 hours ago
            Who?
            • egberts1 18 hours ago
              the Bassel Khartabil Free Culture Fellowship; Mark Surman, Kathryn Mayer, Ryan Merkley (Common Creative) ...
      • pocksuppet 20 hours ago
        Just install it on Graphene. You don't need a new OS and they should each focus on their core competencies.
      • cromka 23 hours ago
        Or team up with Grapheneos. This space is fragmented enough and some unity would help to promote the privacy cause.
        • jazzyjackson 23 hours ago
          An OS that rejected non determinism could really find a niche. Anyone over the age of 35 hates it when their phone changes its behavior, or moves a checkbox from one submenu to another, let alone having a chatbot taking actions on your behalf.

          Just give me tech that works the same every time.

          • devilbunny 16 hours ago
            Amen. It’s like modern app developers have never heard of muscle memory. You could fly through operations in Lotus 1-2-3 or WordPerfect because every single option was available within five keystrokes or so. Now I have to go find things buried in some random place? Ugh. Do it with social apps if you must. Don’t innovate with practical apps. Uber/Lyft, Resy/OpenTable, banking - those should work the same way every time.
          • drfloyd51 22 hours ago
            Then buy an older phone and never upgrade it.

            Because that is really what you are asking for. Buy a device and an OS for life.

            What do you really mean?

            • opan 5 hours ago
              I'm interpreting it as something like vim, where it continues to receive updates but the fundamentals remain unchanged so your muscle memory continues to pay off.
            • jazzyjackson 19 hours ago
              Yes I like my Sonim XP3+ flip phone

              The buttons are programmable and nothing ever changes

              It’s vulnerable as an old Android OS but I simply don’t do anything important except take phone calls.

            • matkoniecz 15 hours ago
              Where I can buy phone working for more than 8 years or one I can rebuy after 8 years?

              That would support standard banking apps?

            • RunSet 22 hours ago
              A Nokia 3310 that supports USB tethering to a laptop would suffice.
        • xeonax 11 hours ago
          Is grapheneos supposed to provide more security to app for the developers than the user of the device. What happens when the user is malicious?
      • GuB-42 23 hours ago
        If it goes as well as Firefox OS, maybe not the best idea.

        But a pager-style device is certainly doable if there is a market for it, and probably the best in terms of security. The question is whether or not Signal (the company) accepts it on their network. Normally, they don't allow third party clients.

        • worik 20 hours ago
          I loved Firefox OS.

          I had the phone.

          It was great.

          • GuB-42 19 hours ago
            It is not that Firefox OS was bad. It is that it was a commercial failure that diverted resources from the Firefox browser.

            From my experience, Firefox was pretty bad compared to Chrome at that time, and the mobile app was even worse. It corresponds to the time I switched to Chrome, I only switched back to Firefox later, when they fixed some of their mess and Chrome enshittified.

            To me, it was a strategic mistake. Firefox took advantage of the shortcomings of Internet Explorer to become significant, as switching browser is relatively easy. Trying to attack Android is a different story, you can't change your phone OS like you can switch browsers, and Google actually made good software and had a good reputation at the time, and as expected they failed. Not only that but they also seemed to have neglected their browser for too long, so they also lost the only battle they could have won.

            If Signal begins making an OS, what will happen to the app? Signal is just a small company, against them are Meta, Google, Apple,... and they don't have the critical mass to hold their users for long. They can't really afford to divert their attention away from their main product. They can however partner with others (someone suggested GrapheneOS) for this.

            • godelski 18 hours ago

                > you can't change your phone OS like you can switch browsers
              
              There's a chicken and egg problem here. Sometimes you need to target power users first. Think about how the first Tesla didn't go after the everyday driver (like many other EVs). Went after people that wanted fast cars and could afford a high price. They then get established and can bring costs down to make cars that are more reasonably priced.

              I think Mozilla killed it too soon. They got buyin from the nerds. They should have then used that as evidence that they could ship phones with it preinstalled. Though that's tricky because Mozilla doing anything generates lots of criticism from the community plus if they ship on a subpar phone people will conflate hardware issues with software. Us nerds are hard to please and we kinda just like complaining

              • GuB-42 18 hours ago
                It is indeed a chicken and egg problem, for an OS to be popular, you need apps to be compatible, and for developers to target your OS, you need it to be popular.

                That's why you need some way to bootstrap the system. And Mozilla, I think, didn't take it seriously enough. By comparison, Signal did. Signal originally was a pretty good SMS app that provided encryption on the side, so, use Signal for your SMS, and if the other guy has Signal too, then it is encrypted, making the switch easy. I wish they kept SMS support but that's another story. Also one of the few compromises Signal made to privacy is their system that let you know that your contacts use Signal, to create a network effect.

                For Firefox OS, I always thought they should have focused on Android first. The idea would be to first make an app framework for Android, something like Electron, but based on the Gecko engine. Now, developers can start developing Firefox OS apps that run on Android, no additional development costs, and judging by how Electron is successful (much to my dismay), it could have worked. This would have served the Firefox mobile app as well.

                They probably should have considered at least some compatibility with Android apps on Firefox OS. Firefox OS is Linux, like Android, and Android is open source, they probably could have done it with reasonable effort.

              • devilbunny 16 hours ago
                It’s unfortunate that the way phones work don’t let you have a Signal the way we have Tailscale. TS is a product sold to geeks in management, and the way they sell it is to make the free tier available and not terribly restricted vs the paid. No non-geek is going to know it exists, let alone use it, but it has been an absolute godsend for me in dealing with family. “Here, let me install this on your computer, then I will be able to see into your network and fix things. Also, you can look at my large collection of Linux ISOs.”
      • 150g2 22 hours ago
        [dead]
    • ls612 20 hours ago
      Ideally you would want the allow Siri AI toggle to be “Yes”, “Local models only” and “No”.
    • HumblyTossed 1 day ago
      If this is true, does it not throw some water on the coals of Apple's "We're so secure" stance? Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
      • Barbing 1 day ago
        As I understand it, the issue on iOS is Siri’s access to screen content. It's useful to be able to e.g. read Hacker News in Safari and be able to say, “Hey Siri, what do these three obscure acronyms in the comment at the top of my screen stand for?” Unfortunately, when iOS 27 was first released, there was no way to exclude an app like Signal from this feature. So if you had Signal open and you triggered Siri to ask an unrelated question, you could inadvertently send a screenshot of your Signal chat to the cloud.

        Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:

          Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps
        • boplicity 1 day ago
          Really should be:

              Settings > Siri > App Access Permissions
          
          With the option to "always ask," or "always allow," or "never allow."
          • rolosa 1 day ago
            As long as there's an easy way to get to it that doesn't involve digging through settings. The whole "[app] wants to paste from your clipboard" prompt is so god damn annoying.
          • dylan604 1 day ago
            This is one of those obvious situations where should and reality are not any where close to each other. Of course, Apple will want the default to be open and every thing whitelisted so "it just works". When someone wants their new shiny to be accepted, they will never go for the everything must be specifically allowed by user as the default.
            • AnthonyMouse 1 day ago
              The way they ought to do it is like this: The app specifies the default (which is "allowed" if they don't specify, but then Signal can specify otherwise), the user can then change it either way, and the app is given no means to tell if the user has changed it (so evil corp can't inhibit the user from doing what they want).
              • TeMPOraL 23 hours ago
                Yes, this. I'm fine with default being "no", as long as it can be flipped to yes (at least per-app, for any app), and the apps having no say or knowledge of it if the user decides to opt-in.
            • dwaite 11 hours ago
              "Should" depends on the user persona.

              If the default for Lockdown mode users was to send information to the cloud I'd say that was a not just a bad default but a critical issue.

              If the general public's first response to "lets put this on my calendar" is "You need to go into 'Settings -> Siri AI -> Security and Privacy' to approve my ability to read from Messages", then that is a huge fail.

            • reactordev 1 day ago
              Yeah, unfortunately the guy who really championed privacy at Apple, passed away. Jobs would have been furious if AI had access to his chats without his permission.
              • brookst 1 day ago
                Apple’s been good (not perfect, but good) on privacy post-Jobs. PCC, PAT, and AVP’s bias toward privacy at the expense of utility come to mind.
        • Barbing 19 hours ago
          > Thankfully, Signal pushed

          Meant to credit the EFF there actually, though probably both

        • bilbo0s 1 day ago
          Hate to be that guy, but why would that option be Siri, or even Signal, specific?

          If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent any app, on any OS from getting screen access?

          Serious question.

          I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way.

          BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end.

          • godelski 22 hours ago
            I'm going to take a guess. But we'd have to guess unless we are the actual Apple designers. But I'd wager that the thing is that Apple doesn't see themselves as part of the user's threat model. So them being able to see your content is not a privacy issue. There's reason to act that way, after all, they have control of the hardware and core software and that is a high level of access. Even for fully open source systems you still have to have lots of trust.

              > Across linux
            
            Yes, but you do need to go to great lengths to do this. The reason is because there's so many things that subtly can extract data. If you want to prevent a system that can take screenshots, then you have to disable screenshots entirely. You have to disable screenreaders. That's all possible, but does interfere with user experience, all because you're concerned about someone potentially hijacking that system. Truthfully that's not in most users' threat models. Similarly you'd have to disable all USB ports and capabilities because a USB device can control your system (see rubber ducky). And many more. To give you a small example, go install noscript into your browser (or install the tor or mullvad browser and put on the strict security settings and browse the internet). It increases privacy and security, but it does come at a big UX cost.
          • radiospiel 23 hours ago
            If i am not mistaken a user must approve screen access for any apps. By default they don’t have that. What signal asks for is to exclude their windows from the screenshots these other apps make.
          • TeMPOraL 22 hours ago
            I reject the assumption that users trying to exercise their right to compute and end-user automation are morons, and truly believe the feature set you're proposing is user hostile.

            The most secure computing system is an inert rock. It's also not very useful.

      • phoghed 1 day ago
        Aren’t they implying that the users on the other side of your chats explicitly grant that access to their ai agent?
        • _heimdall 1 day ago
          I believe the implication is that an OS may give its own AI tool direct access to see and interact with what is on the screen, including messages shown in a messaging app.
      • GuB-42 22 hours ago
        Apple priorities are: 1-profits, 2-convenience, 3-security, 4-privacy. Same as most mainstream companies like Google and Microsoft. The difference is that there is less of a conflict between 1 and 4 in Apple than in the others because they make most of they money from hardware sales.

        AI agents sure are convenient. By looking at your messages they can tell you that there is an accident on the road to the airport your flight is departing from and that you should consider leaving early. So it gets prioritized over privacy.

        For people who are against that tradeoff, Apple can make your device less convenient (lockdown mode), I guess that's an advantage over competitors.

      • _heimdall 1 day ago
        I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.
        • georgemcbay 22 hours ago
          > I expect the risk vector would primarily be related to OS-level AI tools being given to see whats being rendered on screen and interact with it. Signal can encrypt at rest and between devices, it can't encrypt when actually rendering text to the UI tree.

          Yeah, it is likely this.

          A decade ago I worked for a company that provided secure communications apps (email, IMs, etc) for both Android and iOS and (as one of the Android developers) I remember pointing out to higher-ups that it was trivial to write an app on Android that would tie into the accessibility APIs Android provided to bypass all of our app's network and storage security (the accessibility APIs would allow you to automatically read the text out of any standard OS text controls of any installed app while running as a background service to provide alternative means of presenting the data, like text to speech, etc).

          But instead of providing accessibility, an attacker app could just take all that data and silently upload it somewhere.

          This did mean the attacker would have to physically access the phone one time to install the accessibility logger service (or they'd have to phish a user to install it themselves), but after that initial install they could forever bypass the security on our app with absolutely no way for the user to know data was being exfiled unless they are the type that is meticulously auditing which apps are installed on their phone.

          Destroying accessibility is unfair to people who need it, but I recommended we add a feature to our app that would default to notifying the user with a clear warning whenever another running app had accessibility read access.

          My recommendation never got followed, at least for the remainder of my time at that company (they got bought up by Blackberry about a year later and the office I was working in got shut down).

          • _heimdall 11 hours ago
            Yep, I ran into similar concerns around 15 years ago while working for Windows Phone, though at the time we didn't actually expose accessibility tree access.

            I both don't understand why LLM providers want agentic use via screenshots or screen scraping and am grateful that they didn't decide to just use browser accessibility trees for browser use features. I don't expect we'll be that lucky on mobile where a11y features don't require industry agreement and standard implementations.

        • j45 1 day ago
          Maybe signal can change how they render text on the screen. Nothings perfect, but maybe render it themselves?
          • _heimdall 11 hours ago
            Any protection against this requires OS support.

            Screenshots, for example, can be prevented only if the OS provides an API for apps to use to prevent screenshots being taken of sensitive information.

            Similarly, if an OS gives LLM(s) access to content as rendered on the screens, via accessibility APIs or similar, that will leak any information made readable to the user unless and API is provided to opt out of that access.

          • RunSet 21 hours ago
            Screenshots tend to capture a black rectangle instead of the screen area rendered using a hardware overlay.[0] Perhaps Signal could use that. Although there are likely ways to circumvent it.

            [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_overlay#Screen_shots

            • dwaite 11 hours ago
              The operating system controls the hardware channels, as well as memory access, and in the mobile space often the ability to restrict distribution of software.

              It is far simpler to try to convince the OS vendor to work with you than to pretend you can fight them with technical means while in the sandbox they gave you.

          • zugi 1 day ago
            Like render all your chats as Captcha text so the AI can't read it?
            • j45 1 day ago
              Maybe, or just render it as an image. Or render it as individual pixels. Things might not be perfect but it would be a start. :)

              Rust / WebAssembly can do a lot.

              • warkdarrior 17 hours ago
                > or just render it as an image. Or render it as individual pixels.

                OCR is automatic, high quality, and dirt cheap nowadays, even on device.

      • godelski 22 hours ago

          >  Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
        
        How do you think those toast notifications work? That has to integrate with the iOS system, which needs to be able to read (at least part of) the message. While that's default behavior, you can disable, but that requires you not being able to preview your messages. Though different levels of security/privacy for different preferences and threat models. So pick your own.
      • solyin 1 day ago
        You wouldn't, but someone you're talking to has connected the desktop app to their signal account, and is also using Claude in YOLO mode.
        • TeMPOraL 22 hours ago
          That would be me, except I'm not using Signal because of its philosophy being completely opposite to mine :).
    • TeMPOraL 23 hours ago
      Would like to know more about it. Where are those AI apps with access to user chats? I'd like to have one, would save me some time on copy-pasting Whatsapp messages to Claude.
  • ada-h00k 1 day ago
    I wish they would go one step further and alert every user of such a system that it contains spyware, and then recommend alternatives like GrapheneOS or Linux for desktop computers. Relying on Apps that meant to remain private to prevent screenshots from being taken won’t work in the long run. Users need to regain control over their operating system.
    • TeMPOraL 22 hours ago
      > Users need to regain control over their operating system.

      GrapheneOS is not a direction in that, you're just trading one megacorp for different not-yet-megacorp. Both have security-first manifest, which means both insist on making the devices secured from their owners.

      • other8026 21 hours ago
        That is very inaccurate. GrapheneOS is open source and people are more than welcome to make their own custom builds. Although we don't support rooting, many do. That's up to them.
        • esperent 9 hours ago
          > people are more than welcome to make their own custom builds

          This argument (or the equivalent "just fork it") gets trotted out whenever anyone has a complaint about the company behind any open source software.

          It's bunk. Sure, if we're talking about a library with a couple of thousand lines, just fork/build it.

          But we're talking about an entire operating system here. Building it (and then the even harder part of getting it installed on your phone) will be beyond the capabilities or interests of most people, even with agentic help. And then presumably if you're doing that, it's because you want to actually change something non-trivial, in which case even for an interested, reasonably skilled person with agentic help I would say were talking about a week to potentially months of work, not to mention the ongoing upkeep after that.

          • ada-h00k 7 hours ago
            Of course, creating your own graphics drivers or overhauling the entire security model isn't that easy. However, most changes aren't that complex, and with GitHub Actions, it's relatively easy to keep things like that up to date automatically. You just create your patches, which are applied before the build, and if that stops working at some point, you tell your coding agent to get it working again.
        • drdexebtjl 20 hours ago
          Sure, but apps will not run because the build will fail attestation.

          Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along, relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist you.

          • other8026 19 hours ago
            What do you mean "the build will fail attestation"? Do you mean Play Integrity, because what you said there isn't clear.

            > Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along

            Again, not sure what you're talking about, but if you are talking about Play Integrity, then that couldn't be farther from the truth. We've been talking about this issue for a long time now, calling Google out on it, and even talking with regulators.

            > relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist you

            This also doesn't make any sense. Apps don't have to allowlist GrapheneOS for them to work.

            • teravor 19 hours ago
              aren't the bank apps that allow GOS specifically allow GOS organization signing keys?
              • palata 19 hours ago
                No. They specifically ban everything but Google and GOS.

                Banks don't have to use remote attestation, they choose to. Don't blame GrapheneOS for that.

                • teravor 19 hours ago
                  the OP was the one making the claim that all you have to do is build your own GOS.

                  clearly that's false as it needs to be signed by the organization to be of much use as a day-to-day device.

                  • palata 18 hours ago
                    > the OP was the one making the claim that all you have to do is build your own GOS.

                    The comment you answered to does not mention building your own GOS?

                    • teravor 17 hours ago

                          > That is very inaccurate. GrapheneOS is open source and people are more than welcome to make their own custom builds. Although we don't support rooting, many do. That's up to them.
                      • palata 16 hours ago
                        But if GrapheneOS supported rooting, banks would obviously not accept to run their app on it, since the whole point of their using the attestation is that they don't want that.

                        So... I don't know what you are saying. That because you cannot have root AND your bank app, therefore GrapheneOS... what exactly?

                        • drdexebtjl 15 hours ago
                          Should have taken a principled stance against hardware attestation.

                          Banks don’t accept running on GrapheneOS even without root. Hardware attestation hurts them. They ask their users to complain to their banks, leave reviews on the app store and be loud about it. To end this practice that violates the users’ freedom? No, just to whitelist GrapheneOS, fuck everyone else.

                          They just want another key to the walled garden.

                          In practice, it doesn’t matter if it’s open source, it doesn’t matter if you can root your phone. These are just marketing words to appeal to tech-savvy users. Because in practice, trying to exercise your freedom means you have a brick in your hands.

                          • palata 14 hours ago
                            I genuinely don't know what the hell you are trying to say. Just ranting, right?

                            I, too, am pissed at banks that require remote attestation. Or goddamn Netflix & co with their DRMs. But that's not a reason to write nonsensical rants all over the place.

                            Go back to your Google-signed Android or iOS, I'm sure you'll be happier there.

                            • drdexebtjl 14 hours ago
                              Read the thread again. OP comment is about recommending GrapheneOS so “users can take back control”.

                              The point is that GrapheneOS does not give you control. That’s it. No rant. Use your alternative OS all you want, and when it stops being aligned with your needs, you’ll be stuck in the same place you were with Google-signed Android and iOS. How’s that control?

                              • palata 13 hours ago
                                Not in the same place, that's the whole point. You have a lot more control with GrapheneOS. Granted, DRM suck all the same (but they work), and some banks (not all) suck more.

                                It is very much a different place.

                                > How’s that control?

                                Well it's a tradeoff. Your alternative to not watching DRM-ed Netflix is to not watch Netflix, that's all there is.

                        • teravor 16 hours ago
                          root status is revealed during attestation
                          • palata 14 hours ago
                            I don't understand what you are trying to say. Can you pause for a moment, think about it and write something intelligible?
        • yjftsjthsd-h 19 hours ago
          If someone made a custom build, then it wouldn't be GrapheneOS. The statement is about GrapheneOS, so it's true.
      • throwawayk7h 22 hours ago
        GrapheneOS is a non-profit organization.
        • ninglor 17 hours ago
          So was OpenAI.
          • palata 16 hours ago
            So what? GrapheneOS is open source, it's all that matters. When you stop agreeing with what GrapheneOS does, you fork it.
      • ada-h00k 22 hours ago
        In the case of GrapheneOS, this is justified by its security model and is not intended to work against the user but rather to protect them. In addition, the source code is freely available, and it is very easy to create your own versions.
      • upboundspiral 22 hours ago
        IMO Graphene ties a good line between appliance and totally hackable.

        They allow you to isolate google-apps - great.

        They don't allow root - meh, I guess, but I'm not really trying to do real work on a phone (or I'll just use termux).

        The fact you can't change the lowest levels of the operating system might be annoying if you're and Android developer (idk) but as a user its not so bad.

        The great thing is they are open source. If a group of like minded people wanted to distrubute GrapheneOS but hackable I'm sure they could if they had the expertise and resources.

        And if GrapheneOS somehow becomes malicious I'm sure someone will fork them and form a like minded community around different values.

        • other8026 19 hours ago
          > They don't allow root

          That's not really true. We don't _support_ rooting and discourage it, but people definitely do root GrapheneOS. There are also guides on how to do it, etc. I've even seen people do some other weird stuff by making changes to the official images and re-signing them.

        • dingaling 18 hours ago
          > but I'm not really trying to do real work on a phone

          For many people, they have no device other than their phone on which to do real personal work.

          That somehow we've accepted that a super-powerful pocket computer is just a slab for scrolling TikTok and running banking apps is a _tragedy_

          Instead of shrugging we should be rebelling. Reject attestation, reject users being treated as hostile actors on their own devices, reject being told you can't be trusted to control your computer.

          • TeMPOraL 18 hours ago
            > For many people, they have no device other than their phone on which to do real personal work.

            Strong point. Somewhat weaker, but also relevant, is that foldable phones at this point cross strongly into "devices for doing real work" space (a tablet sized screen with logistics of a regular phone does a lot here), and as a user of one[0], I feel increasingly limited by the bullshit limitations the platform and app vendors introduce to lock the user out of their own device while keeping privileged access for themselves.

            So if you don't care about the poor, there's also now the ones with expensive phones to cater - another reason to stop treating mobile devices as TikTok consumption devices.

            > Instead of shrugging we should be rebelling. Reject attestation, reject users being treated as hostile actors on their own devices, reject being told you can't be trusted to control your computer.

            Very much this.

            --

            [0] - Galaxy Z Fold7 + small Bluetooth keyboard and a foldable mouse for heavier work, have made my personal laptop redundant; I haven't turned it on in over a year now.

      • drnick1 22 hours ago
        With Graphene, at least, you can build your own image and strip out restrictions you disagree with. For example, you can restore root or excise enraging limitations like the ability to screenshot your own apps. The Graphene developers probably don't condone such modifications for various reasons, but you don't have to agree with them.
    • rcxdude 22 hours ago
      Regaining control would also allow overruling the kinds of restrictions that these apps put in (which to be clear, I think is a good thing).
    • owebmaster 4 hours ago
      Or just Linux on a phone.
    • Joel_Mckay 1 day ago
      Most modern malware is ram resident only, and it resists forensic analysis to hide the payload RCE.

      The issue is telecoms are some of the most devious monopolists you will ever encounter. They literally helped change laws, add certification barriers, assist 3 letter organization campaigns on US citizens, and self-sign firmware images... blacklisting 3rd party OS on hardware though imei anti-theft systems.

      Starlink is successful because they pulled off a miracle business deal getting these telecoms to cooperate with Direct Connect satellite VoLTE services. =3

    • i2talics 21 hours ago
      I get where you are coming from but this would just come across as patronizing. Nothing says "user control" less than an app nagging you to reinstall your entire operating system. Sometimes (especially if you want privacy to be commonplace) you have to meet users where they are at.
    • superxpro12 22 hours ago
      ooops, you are now norton antivirus
    • karel-3d 1 day ago
      Signal doesn't even officially support GrapheneOS... they are not on their app store and the APK download has a big "dangerous, don't do it!" sign

      https://signal.org/android/apk/

      • subscribed 21 hours ago
        > Signal doesn't even officially support GrapheneOS...

        It doesn't have to, signal runs on AOSP and doesn't enforce the fake "security" theater Play Integrity scam.

        So why should it "officially support" GOS?

        > they are not on their app store

        Why should Signal be in GrapheneOS app store? Their app store is intentionally so minimal, there's no good reason do add the unrelated, optional app if Signal doesn't restrict installations from Play Store or Aurora.

        Signal can work on being added to Accrestent if they want to be promoted, but that's unlikely given that Signal has a ~hard reliance of GCM for notifications (and apparent refusal to adapt Unified Push as an option).

        Signal is aiming for being a mainstream, not niches like GrapheneOS, I'm afraid.

        • palata 19 hours ago
          > Signal is aiming for being a mainstream

          Which it does really well, and it is actually the only non-BigTech, E2EE messenger app that remotely achieved that.

          > not niches like GrapheneOS

          I don't think GrapheneOS wants to be niche? If you install the Google Services on GrapheneOS, normies genuinely cannot see a difference with any other Android they have seen in their life.

      • upboundspiral 22 hours ago
        You can use obtainium to stay up to date via their apks. For most people downlowding via play store to get automatic updates is probably more secure as gapps are preinstalled and obtainium while excellent is not in the mainstream (yet, I guess).
      • fph 23 hours ago
        What do you mean? GrapheneOS recommends using their sandboxed Play Store to download apps, and Signal recommends downloading their app from Play Store.

        The GrapheneOS store has less than 20 apps and does not include third-party ones, just system apps.

      • other8026 19 hours ago
        Signal works just fine on GrapheneOS. They don't have to officially support it for it to work.
      • Brian_K_White 22 hours ago
        This is incorrect on both counts.

        A Graphene user should install from the play store.

        So they do support Graphene and do not warn people not to install Signal on Graphene.

        If you don't want to use the play store, not even anonymized via the Aurora store, then you have a special case, and this special case apk exists just for you.

  • lukeschlather 23 hours ago
    The frustrating thing about this is now you can't take screenshots of a Signal chat on Windows. Yes, you can use screenshotting to get around retention or whatever, but that's a basic feature.

    Another similar thing recently was I was trying to help a woman send a document to her lawyer, and for whatever reason I couldn't figure out how to share it with him via text or whatsapp. Somehow I was able to share it to my own phone via whatsapp, and from there I made a group text in Whatsapp with me and her lawyer to share the document.

    With AI agents I think we're similarly getting into territory where it's not so clear-cut as Signal is making things out to be. I share the knee-jerk "keep your agents out of my stuff!" reaction but I don't think that's a sustainable/pragmatic choice. It might be correct as a principle but if it locks you out of the operating system, it's not Signal's job to disable key OS features on the grounds that the OS is insecure - at a certain point Signal might as well just wipe the hard drive, but that's not Signal's role. Signal is there to enable people to send messages, not stop them from doing so.

    • drnick1 22 hours ago
      > The frustrating thing about this is now you can't take screenshots of a Signal chat on Windows.

      I find this surprising. What mechanism enforces this? This kind of restriction, AFAIK, is only possible on Android and iOS because users do not control the system (no "root" on user builds). On Linux, I certainly can screenshot Signal or any other "app" because the whole OS is under my control.

      • altairprime 22 hours ago
        Apps on the major platforms can opt specific windows into ‘do not allow screen capture or recording’: originally used for protected DVD content, it’s now also able to be used for secure credential entry dialogs or for Signal. The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal, so that I can see when someone I trust binds an untrustable client to our conversation. Linux is not necessarily an untrustworthy Signal platform, but as it stands today it is, as you point out, incapable of such protections and therefore ineligible for evaluating whether I can trust your client platform, and thus untrustable. (Unless you’re using a sealed Linux distro like Bazzite, in which case at least then one could reasonably determine whether your Signal instance is secured against local capture or not.)

        ps. Yes, trust is an onion, blah blah HDMI decoder boxes, etc, but I’m limiting the problem space to ‘software solutions only’, matching the problem space that the vast majority of AI device scanning of Signal content occurs in.

        • drnick1 21 hours ago
          > The only defense against Linux will be tying device attestation status into Signal.

          I would stop using Signal if it required "attestation," which my GrapheneOS phone does not have anyway.

          • altairprime 20 hours ago
            You’re implying ‘required’, but I’m not. Letting the other party in your conversation know whether your app and platform is secure against interception is not a requirement enforced. That’s between you and the other party.
        • lukeschlather 22 hours ago
          The whole "don't trust the user's device" is almost even more problematic than it is for the DVD case. At least with the DVD case this is all by design getting in the user's way. This ends up being Signal stopping the user from doing something they want to do, on the grounds that Signal knows best (but the user is just forced to use a different app, eliminating the benefit.)
          • altairprime 20 hours ago
            Doesn’t Signal already offer a checkbox that can be unchecked to allow the user to operate as they see fit on Windows? They said they’ll do the same on the other platforms in this post, so it’s unclear why users would be “forced to use a different app” rather than just unchecking a box.
      • tredre3 21 hours ago
        It's also possible on Windows (SetWindowDisplayAffinity). What you call a restriction that takes control away from the user's control is actually an important security feature and Wayland will hopefully implement it (with user control I'm sure).

        It's not even hard to imagine why this is useful. Imagine you're sharing/streaming your screen and your password manager accidentally opens on the shared area.

    • jddecker 20 hours ago
      There is an option in the Windows client in settings, under privacy, called screen security. If you turn that off, then you can take screenshots.
    • skybrian 20 hours ago
      It's a bit awkward, but one workaround is to take a picture of the screen instead.
    • XorNot 21 hours ago
      The problem with all things Signal related is that it eventually encourages people to think about things they're accustomed to not thinking about and so you get a lot of very silly outputs.

      With the biggest one being the number of people who apparently assumed that when they send a message to someone, that person couldn't just tell anyone else what they said anyway.

  • cimnine 1 day ago
    I would appreciate if Signal published the findings of their 'forensics investigation' so that other app developers with fewer resources could profit. If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.
  • exceptione 18 hours ago
    As much as I love the idea of Signal, it does not work with vpn's. Adding a new contact when connected to vpn results in endless battles with captcha's. If you take privacy serious, you first make sure you are not forcing users to reveal their IP address. The situation is so bad that people who needs the most protection (like journalists and their sources) have to use other apps. This is a problem that persists for yours by now. Fix your horrendously stupid spam protection first, Signal.
    • palata 16 hours ago
      If you care about security, you understand that it's not black or white. There is a thing called "a threat model". I suggest you read about it.
      • exceptione 4 hours ago
        Calm down. Some countries block Signal, making it even impossible to setup Signal without a VPN at all.

        Also, I am mostly talking about privacy, not systems security.

        • palata 3 hours ago
          You're showing that you don't understand that it is a tradeoff.

          If you build a messaging app to protect your users against the NSA, then it won't be accessible to most people. If you build a messaging app that has all the features all the users want and "just works", then it won't be very private (see Telegram).

          The whole game is to choose what you solve. Signal has been extremely successful at that: it is trading some amount of convenience for more privacy, and some amount of privacy for more convenience. Signal literally put E2EE on the map for normies. Saying that they are not serious about privacy just shows how much you ignore about how security works. It's not just you: see all the people who couldn't explain how the Signal protocol works (even at a high level) but are the first ones to say "I cannot tolerate it because it requires my mobile phone, and my personal threat model is that I am obviously so important that leaking the fact that I use Signal would put me at risk".

          "I won't use it unless they remove the need for the phone number" or "it is not open if they don't enable root access by default" is the equivalent of talking for hours about the unboxing experience of a product because that's easy to do: it's done by the people who actually don't have anything interesting to say about the product because they just don't understand how it works or how it's built. So they talk about the colour of the box. And they have very strong opinions about it.

  • einszwei 1 day ago
    I am not sure why signal doesn't allow crypto payment (like monero) for their account creation when not using a phone number. To register you either need a phone number or payment method which can both identify you.
    • coherentpony 1 day ago
      Privacy and anonymity are different things.
      • drnick1 22 hours ago
        It's very difficult to have one without the other.
      • Madmallard 1 day ago
        Nah if they are "serious" they offer both. It's a scam until proven otherwise.
        • roughly 1 day ago
          Ah yes, Signal is a scam, this is a serious position held by serious people.
          • solyin 1 day ago
            I would like all of the money I've given to Signal back in that case, please.

            https://signal.org/donate/

            • roughly 1 day ago
              (I’m a regular donator, in case this is a subtle dig to put my money where my mouth is, but yes - everyone who finds real value in it should support them.)
              • Brian_K_White 23 hours ago
                I think they were agreeing with you and joking at the idea of it being a scam.
                • solyin 19 hours ago
                  I was making a funny to try and get people to donate.
      • RunSet 21 hours ago
        But not distinct things, privacy being a subset of anonymity.

        By the way here are three wishes for a magic lamp:

        1. People stop acting like it matters whether privacy and anonymity are different things.

        2. People stop acting like it matters if "Wayland is a protocol".

        3. People stop acting like using all your RAM ASAP is not wasting it.

    • Grombobulous 1 day ago
      Probably because that would open up the platform to a flood of spam bots.
      • snackbroken 1 day ago
        Spammers operate out of countries where they have no fear of legal consequences, so all Signal has to do to deter them from the crypto option is make it more expensive than bulk phone numbers are.
      • questionedon 1 day ago
        It still costs money. I don't see why money in a different form would cause more spam. If it did, they could raise the price if they're getting more spam.

        I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.

        Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.

        The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.

    • NoImmatureAdHom 22 hours ago
      Yeah it is shocking to me that they won't take Monero

      Both for account creation, as you mention, and for donations. I see they do take some crypto for donations now, which is good. But not the most obvious one!

      Take my money guys!

    • panja 1 day ago
      Last I heard, that was coming at a later date
    • opengrass 1 day ago
      Should be buyable desktop only with volume licenses.
    • jon128 1 day ago
      The 501c3 named Signal is effectively running a giant honeypot, or in simpler terms a "scam".

      In real-world practice, the 501c3 named Signal and Amazon Web Services that its servers run on can see the metadata of which users messaged which other users at what time.

      This is why they haven't given the users the option to invite other users with a string (or "token" or whatever) so the inviting user can be messaged without a PSTN number or Google id being demanded from the invitee.

      If you're trying to buy some good shit on the street or meet up at "da show" with urbanite degenerates, Signal is great.

      Serious people, infosec pros, execs, etc stopped using Signal about two years ago -- at least that's what I saw from my corner of the world.

      • autoexec 20 hours ago
        The fact that signal collects and keeps a record of your contacts in the cloud (while lying about that in their privacy policy) is enough to make them too untrustworthy to use for anything serious.
      • qwerpy 1 day ago
        So what do “serious” people use? I have a pretty easy life so I don’t bother straying away from the easy to use apps, but I’m still curious what the l33t hax0rs use.
        • drnick1 22 hours ago
          > So what do “serious” people use?

          Most likely a decentralized service such as a fork of Signal that uses their own infrastructure, or (self-hosted) Matrix, or XMPP.

        • autoexec 20 hours ago
          Last time I wanted private communication I went with Jami. It's a bit primitive looking, but it worked, and jami didn't collect and store any of my data in the cloud like signal does.
        • jon128 1 day ago
          Among the high net worth audience there are a handful of commercially supported forks of the Signal software in use. Others are using a supported fork of Element X which is deemed "polished" among by the less literate of users.

          "Signal" in the previous comment referred to the service hosted by the 501c3 named Signal, not the body of open source software named Signal ; these are overlapping but different things.

          FOSS quietly shines in the private (as in, among private entities).

          Organizations that are universally recognizable as working on "serious" things have coalesced around Matrix and Element X or other Matrix clients (some not FOSS), instead of services hosted by third parties (such as Slack). Different audience but an example of modern literacy.

          "Small" users such as "l33t hax0rs" which I read as "age range of teenager to college freshman", often set up their own XMPP servers and use OMEMO. Perhaps these users are not organized around something "serious", but their choice to have self-respect and gain literacy to act it out is something that can be taken seriously.

          To answer your question more directly: anything with decent technical merit that either doesn't require a 3rd party or the 3rd party can be specifically chosen.

          I recently wrote on this topic, not so much the technical pieces but the vibe-perspective

            https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50417774
        • opengrass 22 hours ago
          rocket.chat/install
        • 2PqboPPmKegvanx 1 day ago
          this is always my problem with it - it seems like lots of people shit on Signal, but never say what either they use or what they recommend (and why)

          it comes across like more of a ploy to get you to scare people away and get them to use other, less secure, messengers

    • dist-epoch 1 day ago
      If you want real security and anonymity, with support for multiple and temporary identities, use SimpleX. Recommended by Whonix, which is recommended by Edward Snowden.

      Signal is for pretend-security.

      • questionedon 1 day ago
        >Signal is for pretend-security.

        No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.

        If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.

        Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.

        • mrinf1nity 1 day ago
          My take: Drains the shit out of batteries too. Also, AI screen readers don't care. If it's on the screen, it can read it.
        • autoexec 20 hours ago
          Signal's metadata policy is to collect and permanently store in the cloud your name, photo, phone number, and a list of your contacts. That's not privacy. It stores that data in a notoriously insecure enclave. It protects all of your data from others with nothing more than a pin which can be brute forced/guessed.

          It's also their policy to refuse to update their privacy policy which is currently lying to users about the sensitive data they collect and store.

          There are better ways to secure your content and meta data from more trustworthy companies.

      • rpdillon 1 day ago
        > Signal is for pretend-security.

        Can we please stop it with this?

    • ZetsuBouKyo 49 minutes ago
      [dead]
  • DASD 1 day ago
    Tangential article for those on Apple platforms - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/victory-you-can-now-ex...
  • Bender 1 day ago
    I will stick with services that can be my dumb pipe and use E2EE libraries that can do MLS [1], OMEMO [2], OTR [3], GPG [4] and manage keys out of band but I do appreciate that services like signal exist to limit the number of governments that can eavesdrop.

    [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security

    [2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO

    [3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...

    [4] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Privacy_Guard

    • doublepg23 18 hours ago
      I have used GPG extensively in both personal and professional settings and it's UX is the definition of "footgun".
    • Flimm 1 day ago
      All of these are vulnerable to AI tools installed on your device or on your contact's device. That's what this article is about.
      • Bender 21 hours ago
        That last droid update did put some AI crap on my phone but I tried my best to disable it. If it gets re-enabled I will force them to ban me.
      • g-b-r 1 day ago
        Those are just protocols, it's the specific apps and applications that have to prevent screenshots and access to their notifications to AI tools
    • gib444 1 day ago
      What does that look like in practice for you, day to day?
      • Bender 21 hours ago
        Neither I nor family use cell phones to chat. They are gamers and I am a crusty ol' fart that has PTSD from cell phones and pagers. Loose lips sink ships.
    • ajsnigrutin 1 day ago
      And how many of the people you chat with daily use all those? Your friends, relatives, elementary school classmates, high school friends who still call you over for a beer (and you them), coworkers from previous projects with new leads etc.?
      • Bender 23 hours ago
        Friends and family use my chat server as a fallback when their primary platform is offline and/or when they have something more sensitive to share such as anything financial related. Some of them know a keyword that means to jump onto my server. I would never try to replace their primary platform.
  • Hhh3u7rhe 23 hours ago
    If Signal were serious about privacy, you wouldn't require a phone number to be linked to your account.

    If you need to reduce spam sign-ups, let me pay a few dollars in crypto instead.

    • datakan 23 hours ago
    • autoexec 20 hours ago
      It also wouldn't store a list of your contacts, your phone number, your name, and your profile pic in the cloud forever while lying about that in their privacy policy either.
      • notsound 15 hours ago
        Signal encrypts all of this. You can criticize SGX and the phone number/payment requirement, but let's not pretend any actor in this space does more to protect users while maintaining mass usability.

        https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/

        https://signal.org/blog/signal-profiles-beta/

        https://github.com/signalapp/ContactDiscoveryService-Icelake

        • autoexec 13 hours ago
          Contact discovery is not what I'm talking about here. It's understandable that there is confusion because signal has been extraordinarily unclear in their communication. The contact discovery service was introduced long before this change. It's even actually mentioned in their privacy policy: "Signal can optionally discover which contacts in your address book are Signal users, using a service designed to protect the privacy of your contacts. Information from the contacts on your device may be cryptographically hashed and transmitted to the server in order to determine which of your contacts are registered."

          The new "we collect your contacts and profile data and keep them forever in the cloud" feature is not the same thing. It is not optional. There is no way to opt out of, or prevent the data collection. It doesn't hash and collect all the contacts from your phone's address book like contact discovery does, instead it stores a record of the people you communicate with while using signal. I'm sure can see why that would be extremely sensitive information for groups like activists, journalists, and whistleblowers.

          It also uploads and permanently stores your profile information in the cloud. This is very different from how the profiles feature was introduced. From your link: The server doesn’t have access to any profile content because it is end-to-end encrypted and shared via the same Signal Protocol messaging channel that already protects your conversations and calls. Now, instead of just transmitting that data over the messaging channel, that profile info is uploaded, stored, and sitting on cloud servers. If you are a signal user and you weren't even aware that all of this was happening, that should tell you all you need to know about how trustworthy signal is, but it gets worse.

          All data collected and stored is also kept using (a notoriously leaky) enclave and it's protected with a pin. (see https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...)

          Their excuse for this new data collection is that it exists for backup purposes. However, they could have offered a local non-cloud backup option or simply made the backup feature entirely optional (and signal users asked for that, in many threads and comments around the time this rolled out, see for example https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-...) but signal refused to do that.

          In fact, in the face of user pushback against the mandatory pin nonsense and growing concern from users and security experts about their new data collection scheme (see https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....) what signal did was to allow users to opt out of setting a pin, but all that did was auto-assign a pin in the background which was then used to upload all the same data to the cloud, even though because the user then has no idea what the pin was auto-set to, they could never use it to recover their profile settings or signal contacts. One of the few things signal was clear about was that by opting out of setting a pin you could never recover your profile and contacts. Uploading and storing the data anyway makes it pretty clear that the data collection was the goal all along.

          As far as other actors who do more to protect users in this space there are many options. The one I've turned to for secure messaging is Jami, and while it admittedly lacks a certain amount of polish, I've had no trouble getting non-technical people set up with it for secure messaging, file transfers, and video calls.

          Of course Signal's biggest sin is lying to users about what their risks are when using the app in their privacy policy which was never updated to include any information after they started collecting and storing sensitive user data in the cloud. Not even when they later added yet another feature (optional this time) which stored the whole contents of messages in the cloud. It's my suspicion that refusing to update their privacy policy is their way of warning people away from the service as loudly as they can, but either way signal is clearly untrustworthy.

  • viktorcode 22 hours ago
    I do not consider any messaging service requiring a mobile phone number as the account handle to be private or secure. One cannot build security on the foundations of inherently insecure technologies.
    • gunalx 22 hours ago
      They did fix that though.
      • viktorcode 22 hours ago
        They still do not provide anonymous way of creating an account. Like email.
        • simonask 21 hours ago
          The upside is that I never get any spam or scammers on Signal, like we see on all other messaging platforms.

          Maybe it's just because it's less widespread where I am, but nevertheless.

          • viktorcode 20 hours ago
            I never get spam on messages either which is e2e encrypted service you can register with mail alone.
        • questionedon 21 hours ago
          The payments use zero knowledge proofs and you can buy an anonymous phone number easily.

          I hope they will add anonymous crypto support, but you can create an anonymous signal account.

          • teravor 19 hours ago
            > buy an anonymous phone number easily

            you can never be confident that it won't be taken from you when the number is inevitably reused.

            there was once a way to prevent that from happening but now you won't even get a notification that it's happening so you won't have a chance to move your number.

            it's less hassle to just never use signal.

          • viktorcode 20 hours ago
            I wrote in another reply that your government may know you paid for the service which may be dangerous. Signal not tracking me is the least of the worries here; your oppressive regime trying to keep tabs on you is the real issue.
    • dosshell 22 hours ago
      > One cannot build security on the foundations of inherently insecure technologies.

      Of course you can?

      Maybe I am missin your point, but that is fundamental basic that you put the encryption and decryption in the ends, and you can transfer over any inherently insecure technologies.

      But you need the ends to be secure of course.

    • daflip 22 hours ago
      It's not true that a mobile number is required since there is also the option to pay a fee to register without a mobile number, just sayin'
      • viktorcode 22 hours ago
        To pay, using a KYC-based system you mean, since Signal does not accept crypto?

        In the countries like Russia they simply blocked incoming registrations SMS from Signal and the others to wade off people from the service. I wouldn't risk using a direct payment in a country famous for jailing people for payments to "extremists" organisations either.

        Just do email, or stop calling yourself "private" and "secure"

        • throwaway74354 20 hours ago
          Russia, China and Iran is an edge case Signal don't care about. Messengers need network effect and there are too many hoops to jump through to make Signal work inside the network where the state is actively opposing that. Just wrong tool for the job and different set of assumptions.

          Most likely such an attempt will fail even earlier than Google/KYC become relevant: their account creation vCaptcha de-facto doesn't accept challenges made from VPN connections (based on app reporting the network status, not endpoint IP).

        • questionedon 21 hours ago
          The KYC based payments use zero knowledge proofs so all that anyone can know is that you bought a signal account.

          I do think they should accept crypto.

          • viktorcode 20 hours ago
            In Russia people were jailed for payments. So, no. Signal should stop inventing excuses and just allow email registration.
        • pcthrowaway 20 hours ago
          Can you not purchase a prepaid credit card with cash and use that to make the payment?
          • viktorcode 20 hours ago
            I've heard that specifically in Russia prepaid cards were banned. And I expect the same from any oppressive government.
  • ifh-hn 1 day ago
    Weird how to signal macos is the least private OS in respect to this topic. Most people consider apple to provide the most private and secure os's.
    • goldenarm 1 day ago
      Consumer sentiment and truth can be orthogonal.

      Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.

      Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.

      • brookst 1 day ago
        What OS providers do a better job of privacy and security? Anyone with decent adoption?
    • cosmic_cheese 1 day ago
      My impression is that the desktop apps have never been very high on the list of priorities. They’ve always felt like checkbox tickers.

      This is unfortunate because a lot of the people who are knowledgeable and care about security/privacy spend their days in front of a keyboard, which is always going to be vastly better to jot out messages with than any kind of handheld mobile device.

    • treyd 1 day ago
      It's been great marketing for them but it's never been actually true beyond what they need to do to make the marketing believable.
    • drnick1 22 hours ago
      > Most people consider apple to provide the most private and secure os's.

      It's certainly not. A reasonably hardened Linux box, preferably running open firmware, is certainly more private, and also probably more secure, at least against interference by Apple.

  • novok 17 hours ago
    It's a bit silly IMO when the OS could read the DB directly and in today's age of models, I wouldn't be surprised if large OS vendors wouldn't have a top 500 apps agent watcher that made ingestors targeted for each released version of the app, especially considering they all are making models and thus have the RL infra to really make those good.
  • palata 19 hours ago
    People who care a little bit about privacy should seriously look at GrapheneOS right now.
  • Halto 7 hours ago
    Your ai agents can easily leak personal data and ciustomer data, how do you manage it
  • caymanjim 1 day ago
    You can't be serious about privacy with a closed-source app and centralized server.

    Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.

    It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.

    It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.

    • whilenot-dev 1 day ago
      Signal is closed-source? I can see APGL3-licensed source code for the Android App[0], the iOS App[1], and the server[2].

      [0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android

      [1]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-iOS

      [2]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

      • ostensible 23 hours ago
        You can review some source. You don't know what's actually running on the production system and who has access to everything.
        • whilenot-dev 23 hours ago
          I don't quite get this take... I can't know what's actually running on any production system out there (except my own), because giving anyone access would be a fatal choice.

          What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?

          • m4rtink 23 hours ago
            The actively fight against self hosted Signal servers and clients - like those where you can know what it is running because it is you (or your friends) running it!
            • tredre3 21 hours ago
              Unless you have some examples, both your statements seem false.

              At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.

              At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.

          • mfro 23 hours ago
            This is a great point and I wonder if we could see some sort of remote attestation for consumer messaging apps. It would do a lot for my confidence.
        • nicce 21 hours ago
          Signal is one of the first apps with fully reproducible builds. Source code matches perfectly the android app and you can get byte identical by yourself. And if client crypto and protocols hold, backend does not matter.
          • commandersaki 21 hours ago
            Not to mention the cryptographic protocols and libsignal have been formally verified:

            https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-alphaproof-code/

          • TFNA 17 hours ago
            Backend matters in this case, because by default Signal uploads your contacts list to the server protected only by Intel SGX, and that has been known for years to be vulnerable.

            "Signal's model means you don't have to trust the server" is a meme post, but it hasn't been accurate since the early 2020s.

        • vlovich123 23 hours ago
          If only Signal was zero trust and then any server implementation would be irrelevant from the security and privacy guarantees it offers.
        • lawn 23 hours ago
          They could open source it and you still wouldn't know what's actually running on their servers.
          • questionedon 23 hours ago
            And it still wouldn't matter.
          • palata 19 hours ago
            What you could do, though, is learn the whole goddamn point of end-to-end encryption.
      • LtWorf 23 hours ago
        At some point the public repository for the server wasn't updated for several years.

        The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.

        • commandersaki 23 hours ago
          The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.

          This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.

          For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...

          • questionedon 21 hours ago
            It's not a problem, but it is true. They keep the spam filter closed source. This person seems to be talking about the server, not the clients.

            And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.

            • commandersaki 20 hours ago
              There is no proprietary blobs in the Signal Server source code.

              The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.

              For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.

    • yoaviram 23 hours ago
      As a person working on privacy tech, this attitude, as well as the one in some of the sibling comments is a major reason we don't have better privacy solutions. Signal is not just better then nothing. It's better then all of the viable alternatives.

      You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.

      • m4rtink 23 hours ago
        It is still valid to point out the false sense of security, not to mention there being an intentional single point of failure (and metadata monitoring).
      • autoexec 20 hours ago
        As a person working on privacy tech you should probably be more concerned with the fact that they store your profile info (name, photo, phone number) and a list of all your contacts in the cloud forever where it's kept in a very questionably secure enclave and avilable to anyone who can guess a pin (https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...) all while they lie about never collecting and storing sensitive data (like your social graph) in their privacy policy because they haven't updated it in years even while they add new features like mandatory data collection and optional message content cloud storage backups. This isn't how a company you should trust with anything behaves.

        There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.

        You can read more about the issue here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....

        Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.

        • devindotcom 19 hours ago
          you really have an axe to grind. lorenzo uses signal you know.
          • autoexec 19 hours ago
            I was a fan. I recommended signal several times. That changed once they started keeping data in the cloud, and once they refused to update their policy I contacted as many of the people I'd recommended the app to as I could to warn them off of it. Before that my biggest gripe was when they stopped allowing both secure messages and unsecured sms/mms.

            I don't think that signal is too incompetent to keep their privacy policy updated. They were doing it regularly before this change. I don't think they're so ignorant that they don't understand why it's extremely important for a service like theirs to be transparent and truthful in their policy either. It's looking like either the company is intentionally misleading people who are in very sensitive situations (including activists and whistleblowers whose lives and/or freedom can be at stake) or they're doing their best to warn people away from using their service as loudly as they can by not updating their privacy policy.

            In either case, because I continue to see people using and recommending signal while unaware of the new (now years old) data collection practices and/or signal's failure to inform users of their actual risks while using the app, I do my best to make sure more people are aware so they can make an informed choice for themselves according their circumstances.

            If Lorenzo is cool with the data signal collects and keeps in the cloud, and how they're doing it, that's great. Every user should have that opportunity, but right now it takes a fair amount of digging to uncover the lies being told in the polices signal has published on their website.

    • Jaxan 23 hours ago
      Is it a business though? I thought it was a non-profit organisation.
    • ahartmetz 23 hours ago
      It is a non-profit company.
    • ostensible 23 hours ago
      > Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc.

      You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.

      But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.

      • ghostpepper 23 hours ago
        In case anyone is unaware, Facebook (and WhatsApp) use the Signal protocol for encryption, although my understanding is they don't fully utilize all the security features that Signal does. I also trust the Signal foundation much more than Meta.

        There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...

        SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.

  • autoexec 20 hours ago
    What a joke. The very first sentance of their privacy policy is still a lie. They've started permanently keeping the sensitive data of every signal user in the cloud which cannot be opted out of, and later added an option to start keeping message content for signal users in the cloud as well, but the first sentence still says "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." which is objectively false.

    When a company lies to their users about their risks when using an app being marketed to activists and whistleblowers whose lives/freedom could be put at risk you know exactly how they feel about protecting their customers.

    • fn-mote 20 hours ago
      > https://signal.org/legal/

      I don't see the same privacy policy online.

      > Signal Terms & Privacy Policy

      > Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information. Signal messages and calls cannot be accessed by us or other third parties because they are always end-to-end encrypted, private, and secure.

      It's _designed_ to never collect...

      > Signal utilizes state-of-the-art security and end-to-end encryption to provide private messaging and Internet calling services to users worldwide (“Services”).

      That is the first sentence I see under "Privacy Policy".

      > Your calls and messages are always encrypted, so they can never be shared or viewed by anyone but yourself and the intended recipients.

      Is this the part that is a lie?

      > Information we may share

      > Other instances where Signal may need to share your data

      * To meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.

      * To enforce applicable Terms, including investigation of potential violations.

      * To detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, or technical issues.

      * To protect against harm to the rights, property, or safety of Signal, our users, or the public as required or permitted by law.

      Oh, I see what you mean. That's pretty broad.

      • autoexec 19 hours ago
        The page opens with "Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information." and that used to actually be true. They liked to brag about all the times law enforcement agencies came to them asking for data only to be turned away because they literally had no data to give them.

        That changed a long time ago when they started collecting and storing sensitive data in the cloud. Exactly the kinds of data they were getting legal requests for. (see https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....). You can fake your name, use a dedicated phone/number, and never upload a photo but your social graph is always highly sensitive data.

        Worse than that they are storing that data in not very secure ways (https://web.archive.org/web/20230519120156/https://community...) and not being very clear at all with users about any of this. At the end of the vice article they talked about adding an option to "disable" the pin, but what they actually did was give users a way to opt out of setting a pin, but that just auto-created a pin for them and then still uploaded all the data to the cloud. There is no way to opt out of them collecting and storing your data.

        If the lie at the top of the page titled "Signal Terms & Privacy Policy" isn't bad enough, their actual privacy policy has also not been updated since before they started with the data collection/cloud storage, so none of that is included in the "Information you provide" section of their privacy policy. That just talks about the optional "contact discovery" feature. They later added another optional feature where you can store actual message content in the cloud too, but still never updated their policy. They say "Signal queues end-to-end encrypted messages on its servers for delivery", but at least in some cases that data is stored in the cloud (also not their servers) forever as a "backup". This also means the "We will update this privacy policy as needed so that it is current" line in their policy is also a lie.

        My best guess is that the company refuses to update the privacy policy as a dead canary to warn others that the service is compromised as loudly as they can (in the US gag orders can stop you from saying things, but can't force you to say something - or in this case to publish updates to your privacy policy). The alternative explanation is that they're just intentionally misleading people who have a lot on the line about their risks when using the service.

  • pandog 14 hours ago
    Not mentioned here - Beeper, with it's Signal and MCP integration.
  • nullc 23 hours ago
    Has signal ever commented on the fact ( https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24191267-wyden_smart... ) that the push notification services that signal forces users to use have been being used to spy on users?
    • datakan 23 hours ago
      They give a literal settings option to block the content of the message in the push notification:

      "Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

      • RunSet 21 hours ago
        > Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."

        Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.

        https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...

      • genxy 23 hours ago
        It is ridiculous that you have to go through multiple steps to "harden" signal. It should have a macro, akin to lockdown mode that turns off all the dangerous features. And their electron app should be running the majority of their logic in multiple wasm compartments.
      • questionedon 23 hours ago
        They wouldn't get the content anyway, even if you didn't have that on. It would just be stored locally like the rest of your Signal messages.
  • aboringusername 1 day ago
    Isn't the solution kind of obvious here? Mobile devices already have permissions (location, file system, contacts, photos/media), so they just need to implement 'AI/agent' access. If denied, agents are simply prohibited from working. It should be an opt-in toggle similar to location when the app starts, it can request the AI/agent permission during its lifecycle at the right moment (such as tapping an 'ask AI' button and a prompt appears with the permission).

    But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.

  • anonym29 16 hours ago
    I love the work Signal has done to bring E2EE to the masses. I've donated to Signal. I've evangelized for Signal. I've been an enthusiastic user since it was TextSecure and RedPhone.

    But I really hope Signal knows it comes across as disingenuous and hypocritical to insist they're serious about protecting user privacy while routing every push notification through a service offered by a documented NSA partner (Google Firebase). This is a huge metadata leak to the adversary that motivated TextSecure to be created in the first place.

    I appreciate the accessibility to "normie" users, but give power users the option to set up their own UnifiedPush distributor, the way Molly does.

  • nl 18 hours ago
    My chat, my agent.

    I use Signal but it annoys me that I can't use some kind of permission based system to give my agents access to my chats.

    • soraminazuki 9 hours ago
      > My chat

      That's a pretty messed up take unless all of the people you're chatting with gave their explicit consent.

      > My agent

      Are you Sam Altman or Dario Amodei?

      • nl 7 hours ago
        > That's a pretty messed up take unless all of the people you're chatting with gave their explicit consent.

        Why?

        Historically it has always been accurate. If you send a letter to someone then you no longer have control of it. Same with email.

        • soraminazuki 4 hours ago
          When someone sends you a private message, they trust that you handle it responsibly. Only a sociopath would think, that puts me in control and I'll do whatever I want.

          It's not like this behavior is excusable outside of Signal, but couldn't you take a hint when someone is communicating with you over a privacy-focused messaging app?

  • quotemstr 1 day ago
    > This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.

    This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.

    • AaronAPU 1 day ago
      It’s interesting they even try to fight this fight because fundamentally they can never control one side of the conversation taking photos or otherwise logging. That they pretend its tractable at all makes me question their security in general.

      Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.

      • dylan604 1 day ago
        That is different than having it sent to the cloud with users "unaware" and then the cloud leaking it though.
      • quotemstr 1 day ago
        They could go full mandatory remote attestion, in principle closing every hole but the analog one. This understanding of privacy, one in which the user is part of the threat model, slouches inevitably towards DRM.

        Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.

    • polishdude20 23 hours ago
      Ok but what about people who you're chatting with? When do they get to tell you "no I don't want your agent to be reading our messages"? Do you disclose that in all your chats?

      As a user of signal, I do expect signal to prevent my chats from being read by anything other than the other contact.

      • TeMPOraL 22 hours ago
        Why should they have any say in this? Once you send a message, you relinquish ownership of it. Same was true and accepted ever since humans learned to write and invented notes and letters. Sender does not get to dictate when and how receiver reads the message, or what they do with it.
      • quotemstr 22 hours ago
        You can choose to disclose attestation status and trust level of other signals without deciding on restrictive policy up front on behalf of everyone
    • crusty 1 day ago
      Don't they though? You can always form it if you don't like their priorities and decisions, just like those for any other feature.
  • tamimio 1 day ago
    Open source both client and server, I can self host server, remove phone number requirement AND any other shenanigans you put as an alternative like payments to unmask people, then we have a start to talk about privacy, other than that, do not trust Signal.
    • questionedon 23 hours ago
      The payments use zero knowledge proofs, so they don't link you to them.
  • EGreg 1 day ago
    Groups is even more serious, but on a different front:

    https://groups.app/confidential.html

    • ebb_earl_co 1 day ago
      Where did you hear about this? I am intrigued and would like to know more.
      • EGreg 1 day ago
        I built Groups, starting nearly a decade years ago, as a privacy-preserving CRM. Since then it’s been downloaded by about 6 million people in over 100 countries. It isn’t as big as Signal by any means, but it has an entirely different focus. You can download it and try it — it’s free:

        https://qbix.com/GROUPS

        Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.

        Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:

        https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...

        • ebb_earl_co 1 day ago
          Thank you! Best of luck in your endeavors.
  • LoganDark 1 day ago
    > This means that we are restricting the latest AI agents built into mobile operating systems from potentially capturing and storing your Signal data.

    I have family conversations in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!

    I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.

    • Flimm 1 day ago
      This outlook is initially appealing. The problem with it is that it is not only your choice that matters, it is also the choice of your contacts. Do your contacts want you to share their private conversations with you with online AI, unencrypted? Do you want your private conversations to be leaked by your contacts?
      • nl 18 hours ago
        Once you send a message you no longer have sole ownership of it.

        Historically this has always been the case and it's unclear why something that is essentially impossible should become an expectation in anyway.

      • lukeschlather 23 hours ago
        These are all great things to worry about. But the fact is, there are lots of situations where if app X can't read data from app Y the data might as well not exist. Usability, security, and integrity are tradeoffs. If you make the app sufficiently unusable you can't protect anything because you just force people to copy the data by hand into a different app.
      • LoganDark 1 day ago
        I'd imagine stuff like this is why, say, Telegram has a difference between "non-secret" and "secret" chats. I'd imagine all Signal would need is a similar mechanism for either locking down an existing chat or making a new locked-down chat. Then you could be confident that none of its participants could be passing it to a leaky or unscrupulous provider.

        Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.

    • genxy 23 hours ago
      If I were in your Signal group, I'd like my signal messages to be invisible to your Siri. Don't violate my privacy just because I message you.
  • lrvick 19 hours ago
    > Signal is Serious About Protecting Your Privacy

    - demands your phone number or a payment method

    - actively hostile to independent reproducible build and distribution efforts by projects like f-droid

    - publicly stated they prefer proprietary app store installs for user metrics

    - built metadata privacy on Intel SGX knowing data is easily exfiltrated

    - Federation is forbidden forcing all global metadata rich network traffic to one infra stack.

    - Almost every Signal binary on the network is signed by one key, with no publicly accountable HSM to prove it is not signing privacy compromised binaries on the side served to specific people

    Centralized authority will never lead to good privacy outcomes.

  • m4rtink 23 hours ago
    Oh, so they will finally support others to build compatible federated alternative servers and clients, make all builds reproducible and drop the need for phone numbers once and for all, right ? Right ?
  • m-hodges 1 day ago
    Some people aren't reading the whole article. You can turn it off if you disagree with the product decision. I'm sure there will be folks mad on the opt-in/out axis either way.

    That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.

  • genxy 23 hours ago
    How about they start encrypting at rest Signal desktop!

    Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?

    • Scramblejams 22 hours ago
      Signal has woefully underinvested in QoL issues like this. Every time they hit me up for a donation, I wish after I tap "no" it would give me the opportunity to tell them why I don't want to donate so I can deliver a bunch of actionable complaints. The usability gaps between Signal and e.g. Viber (at least when I left it after the Rakuten acquisition) or WhatsApp are massive.
    • RunSet 21 hours ago
      > How about they start encrypting at rest Signal desktop!

      Signal does keep the message history in an encrypted sqlite file.

      Unfortunately they store the key in plaintext alongside it.

      • genxy 11 hours ago
        That is fucked up. I don't want to believe that is true.
  • purpleidea 20 hours ago
    This is such a joke. If they were a serious organization they'd:

    * Discuss the issue with google keyboard privacy

    * Discuss the issue with the google translate API

    * Release all of the backend automation code for their infra that runs signal

  • dijit 1 day ago
    As much as they beg and plead, I have a very suspicious automatic gut reaction to US based companies screaming from the heavens about how they're the one true privacy bastion... They have a lot of frothy-mouthed fans who poke their head out immediately when I bring up any of my concerns about things[0] - or when I state that: one company should not be the only one fighting for private messaging.

    The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...

    - or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.

    As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).

    [0]: https://blog.dijit.sh/i-don-t-trust-signal/

    • TFNA 1 day ago
      I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.

      The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.

      • rpdillon 1 day ago
        This is a reasonable take, though I would add that simply compromising the notification server is enough to get the metadata about who's talking to who.

        My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.

    • commandersaki 22 hours ago
      Hasn't Matrix had a series of cryptographic blunders?

      Ah yes, I do remember: https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-ol...

      As for Signal being open source (or your claim in the link that it is not open source as in they don't provide the source for builds; and you only need to look at the client source for the security claims), as of a previous post about Signal on HN I have started verifying the builds on iOS which I can confirm are fully source reproducible:

      https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...

      Signal already provide instructions on Android reproducible builds and it wouldn't really take much to extend that to fully source reproducible.

    • questionedon 1 day ago
      It turns out that good privacy tech doesn't rely on jurisdictions.

      It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.

      Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.

      For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.

      • TFNA 1 day ago
        E2EE is only about message contents. Intelligence services have made it clear that metadata is enough for them, and Signal's code (since at least the introduction of Intel SGX features) doesn't protect that, precisely because of server jurisdiction.
        • questionedon 1 day ago
          But, if it was in an EU country, the media would still be collected by intelligence services. And shared due to the various eyes alliances.

          I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.

          As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.

          I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.

          Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.

          • commandersaki 22 hours ago
            What metadata are you concerned about? Have you seen the evidence tendered by Signal in cases where law enforcement requested data? Usually there's a dearth of data available in such cases except usually a log of when a user has registered and last accessed the servers.

            See https://signal.org/bigbrother/

            • questionedon 21 hours ago
              I'm not concerned.

              This is speculation about mass surveillance by intelligence services. If they're in your threat model then Signal is not the right choice.

              Single is decent for law enforcement in your threat model, but SimpleX is still preferable.

      • dijit 1 day ago
        servers, computers and users all live inside a jurisdiction.

        Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.

        You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.

        Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).

    • krautburglar 1 day ago
      "Moxie Marlinspike" I am not going to trust some jabroni, straight out of central casting, who doesn't even fly by his family name. Seems like yet another usgov+hollywood fabrication. Good on you.

      JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:

      https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/

  • jonny2811 23 hours ago
    they write that every os screenshots all screen content, sends it to a server to be analyzed, and half the comments are bitching how signal is not actually secure.

    what a sad day for hackernews

  • okokwhatever 23 hours ago
    If you have to talk about how much private your platform is...
    • questionedon 21 hours ago
      Please point to what part of the code makes Signal not private. It's all reproducible, so we know that the code in the GitHub repository is what's running on our devices. So please send a link instead of spreading fud with no evidence. What's running on the server also does not matter.
  • 1vuio0pswjnm7 21 hours ago
    Fact: Author is former Google employee, stayed with Google for _12 years_

    Whether this fact is a pro, con or irrelevant to protecting software user "privacy" is a question left to the reader

    Different readers may arrive at different answers. Not all readers will necessarily share their answers in comments. Commenters comprise a small portion of readers

    • questionedon 21 hours ago
      Irrelevant. If only all the people spreading fud about signal would point to problems in the source code because it's all there and it's confirmed to be that same source code that's running on our devices. And it doesn't matter what's running on the server.
    • 1vuio0pswjnm7 19 hours ago
      As it happens, frequently, if not always, the Signal app is compiled by the US-based Signal Messenger Limited Liability Corporation not the Signal app user

      There's no need to decrypt anything when other parties can compel the corporation to remotely install and run executable code on a particular user's computer at any time ("updates", RCE)

      https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/m...

      "Finally, it's time for the moment of truth! Let's compare the APKs that were pulled from your device with the APKs that were compiled from the Signal source code. The [`apkdiff.py`](./apkdiff/apkdiff.py) utility that is provided in the Signal repo makes this step easy.

      Using this script to check the APKs is helpful because APKs are compressed archives that can't easily be compared with a tool like `diff`. The script also knows how to skip files that are unrelated to any of the app's code or functionality (like signing information, or extra harmless metadata added by the Play Store)."

      Signal wants people to verify their Android APKs with a script provided by Signal (cf. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/daniellockyer/apkdiff/mast...) "that makes this step easy"

      Perhaps the reason someone might be trying to verify the APKs match is that they don't trust Signal

    • 1vuio0pswjnm7 18 hours ago
      It's like appointing someone who worked for Exxon Mobil to preside over the Surfrider Foundation

      2018

      https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/824506840_201812_990_...

      2019-2024

      https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/824...

      2024

         Signal Technology Foundation
         Compensation
         Key Employees and Officers                                 Compensation  Related  Other
         Meredith Whittaker (Director / Pres Of Signal Messenger)   $743,531      $0       $51,697
      
         Surfrider 
         Compensation
         Key Employees and Officers                                 Compensation  Related   Other
         Chad Nelsen (CEO)                                          $251,790      $0        $17,872
  • TacticalCoder 21 hours ago
    "We collect metadata, including your phone number, but we care about your privacy". [1]

    Cry me a river.

    [1] or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.

    • questionedon 21 hours ago
      >or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.

      I want them to accept anonymous payments too, but they use zero knowledge proofs, so the non-anonymous payment does not link you to them. Also, they don't get cc number, Google does.

  • vlyan 1 day ago
    no, it isn't.

    if it was, it wouldn't require a phone number or a payment to sign up. that's an utter non-starter for a privacy tool. no public API, no third-party clients, no first-party web client. Signal Messenger LLC is, painfully obviously, a SaaS company operating at a loss and waiting for a buyout from a megacorp.

    and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.

    • questionedon 21 hours ago
      The phone number does not compromise your privacy. There's no rules for privacy tools being a non-starter or not.

      The payments use zero-knowledge proofs, so they're not linked to you. All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account.

      There are third party clients.

      So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy.

      It's a non-profit that can't go against privacy for its users.

      >and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.

      Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone, please point to the code that makes it backdoor in some way. Because you could easily prove these claims. But instead you provide no evidence.

      • vlyan 19 hours ago
        >The phone number does not compromise your privacy.

        it links your account to a government issued ID in most countries.

        >All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account.

        We kill people based on metadata.

        >There are third party clients.

        there is no public API. any platform can have the kind of frankensteined clients that reverse engineer the official one. the point is that if they cared about privacy like the OP claims, the official client would be a suggestion.

        >So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy.

        are you under the impression that web cryptography uses random npm libraries for cryptographic primitives?

        >Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone

        is the server code on github also?

        • questionedon 19 hours ago
          Yes it is.

          https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

          How would you be linked to your phone number if you used usernames and changed them after connecting with the contact as they suggest?

          Web crypto: https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto

          Just as we don't know exactly what's running on a signal server, that's the whole thing with web crypto.

          Maybe a public API matters for user freedom, but it doesn't matter for user privacy.

          >We kill people based on metadata

          Again, signal is not a highly metadata private messenger. So this is a real concern, I agree. But it's for a threat model with more advanced adversaries than national law enforcement like the FBI in the US.

          They do take significant steps to minimize metadata. But it's not anonymous.

          • vlyan 18 hours ago
            >But it's not anonymous.

            and that's exactly my quarrel with it.

            it could've been significantly more anonymous if it was a privacy tool. but it is an "app", and the people behind it want to make money, not to champion privacy.

    • WD-101000 15 hours ago
      Rubbish. Care to explain how a 501c3 cashes out in a "buyout from a megacorp"?

      About two of your points:

      - Either a phone number, or some kind of payment is the best way to avoid being overrun by bots and scammers making huge volumes of accounts. We're living in an age where people can't even run a web page about knitting without being scraped to death, and that's not even by scammers. You want Signal to let anyone make an account, which can burn resources with audio and video calls, without incurring some kind of nontrivial cost to themselves?

      - It's been well-explained why they discourage third party clients (it will interfere with fast development of the service). That's disappointing, but OK for now? What they are doing seems to be working to get a lot of ordinary people to use it.

      FYI a while back (years ago), I built Signal Desktop from their source, and had no trouble connecting and using that as my daily driver Signal client. So at the very least, they tolerate that.

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  • hn_submit 19 hours ago
    I don't trust Signal in the sense that I realize it costs an extraordinary amount of money to run a messaging service with literally billions of users (WhatsApp) on it. The Signal Foundation wouldn't be able to finance Signal operations if too many people started using it and they'd probably end up selling it to some VC who'd immediately force people to buy a subscription or riddle it with ads.

    In addition the new owners would probably undermine the encryption to curry favor with the government.

    No Signal for me. I'll stick with WhatsApp.

    There are still a lot of snafus with WhatsApp like it not using an end-to-end encrypted back-up by default. They make you jump through all sorts of hoops to enable it. I find this fishy since there's always someone in your conversations who hasn't enabled E2E back-ups, enabling LEA and others to read it (eventually). And for some strange reason they're requiring a separate password for the back-up.

    • devindotcom 19 hours ago
      You are basing your decisionmaking on a malicious fantasy, and opting for a product that actually has the problems you ascribe to Signal in said fantasy
      • hn_submit 19 hours ago
        I'm not saying Signal is less secure than WhatsApp. I'm just saying it isn't better.

        And WhatsApp has the added advantage of having a very large and politically connected corporation behind it.

        "Now Moxie you put in that backdoor or we'll put you in a hole so deep no one will ever find you." If they'd threaten Zuck like that all Hell would break loose in the White House.

    • windexh8er 19 hours ago
      > No Signal for me. I'll stick with WhatsApp or (if push came to shove) I'd start my own server.

      All of your argument is pure conjecture and untrue. But the last line is the gold. You'll actively choose and defend using a messenger from the most willing company on the planet to sell you out as your validation. Ignorant thought process said out loud being normalized in 2026 is wild.

      • hn_submit 19 hours ago
        That's because I'm satisfied that WhatsApp's security is sufficient. It's far from bullet-proof and there are loopholes (back-up), but making it less secure would only enable competitors to get a foot between the door so I don't think Meta would do that.

        In addition billions (including 300 million Americans) are using it and the U.S. government would never allow any other nation's intelligence or LEA organization to hack it. I therefore consider it as safe or safer than most alternatives.

        How do you imagine the Signal Foundation would run the service if people started using it as actively as WhatsApp? And with the numbers of users WhatsApp is currently serving? They simply don't have the money or expertise to do that. They'd have no choice but to sell it or curtail the service.

  • dustfinger 22 hours ago
    The simplest solution is often best. Have a separate device you use for activities you wish to keep private, running an OS and software you trust will not infringe on your privacy. Use another device for activities where you have decided the benefits of agents outweigh privacy risks.
    • sbarre 22 hours ago
      When the default OS of phones includes all these agentic backdoors turned on by default, this becomes a pretty naive take.

      I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.

  • coldtea 1 day ago
    >Signal Is Serious About Protecting Your Privacy (signal.org)

    The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.

    • roughly 1 day ago
      Yes, you’d really have to look at, like, their track record - for instance, an entity with something like 20 fucking years of delivering a messaging platform that the fucking FBI regularly complains they can’t read could make that statement with a little more credibility than whoever you’re thinking of.
      • genxy 22 hours ago
        And there is this rabbit who keeps telling me not throw 'em in the briar patch.
    • scottmcmac 23 hours ago
      Coming from a non-profit basically dedicated to that with a great track record, I believe it.

      Similar claims from big tech ad-companies I support... taking with a grain of salt.

    • rpdillon 1 day ago
      Sure, but it's not like Signal doesn't have a track record here.
  • MajorTakeaway 19 hours ago
    Signal is serious about protecting scammers. I've never seen anyone with good intentions use Signal.
  • asxndu 1 day ago
    Signal is run by a careless, low effort team.

    It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.

    How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?

    Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?

    This is a very unfocused team.

    • ada-h00k 1 day ago
      If you don't like Electron, there are also unofficial apps that run natively. For example, I created a Qt based Signal client called Corvus. However, just because the official Client is built with Electron doesn't automatically mean it's insecure. The Signal developers probably know a lot more about these things, so my client is likely less secure in that regard. Not to mention the fact that you then have to trust another person beside the signal devs.
    • TFNA 1 day ago
      signal-desktop is more than a texting app. I use it daily for fairly complex videoconferencing. Yes, Electron is not ideal, but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask.

      And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)

      • busymom0 1 day ago
        Out of curiosity, since signal has a native iOS app, why don't they use the Apple's Catalyst framework to port the same app to macOS?
      • Hhh3u7rhe 23 hours ago
        > but a native app for all of the supported OSes is a lot to ask

        Is it nowadays? AI should be able to port the app to any OS in a couple days.

  • LoganDark 1 day ago
    Bad headline. Everyone is "serious about protecting your privacy". Even vendors who store your passwords in plaintext say that.
    • vaillancourtmax 1 day ago
      Privacy is not the same thing as security.
      • dns_snek 23 hours ago
        Security is a prerequisite for privacy. Claiming to care about privacy implies that you also care about security.
        • LoganDark 20 hours ago
          Privacy is another never having your data in the first place, while security is merely them not giving it back out. When most companies talk about privacy, they usually actually mean security. Because they still ask for your data. They just promise to keep it only to themselves. and often their 300 partners too.

          (Fun fact: Signal only recently enabled registering without sharing your fucking phone number just a few months ago. and only on Android. They don't need your phone number, they don't use it for anything. and you wouldn't want them to. But they want it anyway. That's not privacy.)

          Apple is one of the only companies that truly cares about privacy over mere security. This doesn't mean they don't also have some truly serious security, but rather that they simply don't collect data they don't need, and also that they avoid collecting anything other than what they need.

          Contrast this with other tech giants, who want all your data, but promise to keep it secure.

      • LoganDark 1 day ago
        I understand, but nearly everybody says privacy to mean security, which is one of the reasons this headline is bad.

        Companies even want you to think that them securely holding all your data is the same as it being private to you. That's on purpose.

  • jgalt212 1 day ago
    Signal is great for sure, but is is really useful when WhatApp (which uses signal under the hood) archives all your conversations?
    • internet_points 1 day ago
      WhatsApp doesn't use Signal under the hood. They use or have used some of the same cryptographic protocols; Whatsapp at some point started using the axolotl protocol developed by Signal. But there is no sharing of messages or infrastructure.
    • mplanchard 1 day ago
      Signal the app is not signal the protocol. The latter is what WhatsApp uses. What WhatsApp chooses to do on top of that protocol has no bearing on Signal the app.
      • jgalt212 1 day ago
        Well given the app and protocol have the same name, I could hope the mandarins on this site could understand my confusion.
    • scottmcmac 23 hours ago
      Corrections/clarifications on top of what others have mentioned:

      - WhatsApp only ever said they used an older version of the Signal protocol (that, e.g. lacks post-quantum encryption).

      - I think WhatsApp can encrypt your backups, but that is not the default.

      The backup thing, plus the AI stuff mentioned in the article make it much more likely your WhatsApp conversations end up stored in the clear somewhere than your Signal conversations.

      The other main reason WhatsApp is currently worse than Signal is that WhatsApp harvests your metadata (to support Meta's ad-tech business) and Signal does not.

  • kittikitti 21 hours ago
    https://truthout.org/articles/waltz-reportedly-archived-sign...

    I cannot expect privacy on Signal for voices and opinions critical of Israel. I wouldn't trust any marketing about privacy coming out of Big Tech, YCombinator or Silicon Valley. They made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.